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1. INTRODUCTION
Mirroring the dramatic growth of private equity and venture
capital activity worldwide, private equity and venture capital ac-
tivity in Japan has rapidly increased during the past several years,
despite recent setbacks relating to the bursting of the Inter-
net/telecommunications bubble. During 2000 alone, private equity
and venture capital funds in Japan raised U.S. $2.2 billion, of which
64% (U.S. $1.4 billion) was dedicated to early stage investment.' In
addition, funds outside of Japan have earmarked significant por-
tions of their global funds for investment in Japanese companies.
2
U.S. and European private equity and venture capital funds have
been lured to Japan by several factors. First, Japan's Internet, tele-
communications, and e-commerce markets have been developing
at a high speed and show potential for leading the world in several
promising technologies (such as mobile Internet platforms). Sec-
* Mr. Lebrun is an associate in Shearman & Sterling's New York office who
recently spent two years in Tokyo representing investors and start-up companies
in various venture capital financings. He received his J.D. from Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center and an M.S.F.S. degree from Georgetown University School of
Foreign Service in 1997. The Author gratefully acknowledges Yasutaka Nukina,
an associate at Shearman & Sterling, for his assistance in connection with this Ar-
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those of Shearman & Sterling.
1 2000 Highlights, ASIA PRIVATE EQUITY, Year-End 2000 special issue, at 1.
2 Id.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
ond, the establishment of two new capital markets for venture en-
terprise listings, MOTHERS ("Market of the High-Tech and
Emerging Stocks"), established by the Tokyo Stock Exchange in
November 1999, and Nasdaq Japan, established by the National
Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") and Softbank Corpo-
ration in May 2000, have encouraged private equity and venture
capital funds to invest in Japan by providing additional means to
exit from their investments.
A large percentage of private equity and venture capital funds
earmarked for investment in Japanese companies are controlled by
U.S. and European venture capital firms, private equity firms, and
investment banks. In addition to high profile deals such as Rip-
plewood Holding LLC's acquisition of The Long-Term Credit Bank
(renamed Shinsei Bank), firms such as Goldman Sachs, The Carlyle
Group, and Newbridge Capital have also been active in venture
capital and private equity transactions in Japan.
In the past, most Japanese domestic venture capital transac-
tions were structured and documented quite simply, often taking
the form of a common stock investment with the investment
agreement only a few pages long. However, U.S. and European
venture capital and private equity firms (and increasingly sophisti-
cated Japanese investors such as Softbank and JAFCO as well) gen-
erally prefer to structure their investments in a way similar to
transactions in the United States, wherein preferred stock, man-
agement rights and exit mechanisms provide an investor with sub-
stantial control over and protection for its investment.3
Today, U.S. and European investors will find that Japanese
corporate law accommodates most, but not all, of the techniques
employed in U.S. private equity and venture capital transactions.4
Recent amendments to the Commercial Code of Japan, Law No. 48,
March 9, 1899, as amended,5 (the "Commercial Code" or "Shoho"),
3 Although this Article is limited to the legal considerations concerning Japa-
nese venture capital and private equity transactions, differing expectations as to
the volume and complexity of the documentation for a transaction can be one of
the greatest roadblocks to completing a deal. Many Japanese companies will re-
sist when presented with a typical U.S.-style purchase agreement and/or share-
holders' agreement.
4 This Article addresses only the rules applicable to a Japanese stock corpo-
ration (kabushiki kaisha), the most common form of business organization in Japan.
5 2 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN (Zemtaro Kitagawa ed., 2001) contains an Eng-
lish translation of the Commercial Code including amendments up to and in-
cluding Cbmmercial Code Amendments.
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have facilitated the implementation of such techniques. Most no-
table of such amendments are those approved, by the Japanese Diet
on November 28, 2001 with an effective date of April 1, 2002 (the
"November Amendments"; the Commercial Code as so amended
is referred to herein as the "Amended Commercial Code" or
"Amended Shoho").6
The purpose of this Article is to provide an overview of the
significant differences between private equity/venture capital in-
vestments and documentation in the United States and Japan for
the benefit of non-Japanese principals of private equity and ven-
ture capital firms and their advisors. More specifically, this Article
will consider to what extent the protective provisions commonly
used in U.S. private equity and venture capital transactions may be
used in structuring and documenting private equity and venture
capital transactions in Japan. It will focus on techniques frequently
used in minority equity investments in private companies, al-
though many of such techniques may be used in other forms of
private equity investments as well.7
When making comparisons to U.S. practices, this Article will
refer to Delaware law for illustrative purposes, which is the com-
mon jurisdiction for the incorporation of businesses in the United
States.
2. SUMMARY OF U.S. INVESTMENT TECHNIQUES AND THEIR
AVAILABILITY IN JAPAN
In the following table is a list of protective devices commonly
requested by investors in U.S. venture capital and private equity
transactions. The second column of the table indicates whether or
not such provisions may be included in documentation for invest-
6 The official text of the November Amendments has not yet been published
in Japanese or in English. See Official Website of the Japanese Ministry of Justice,
at http://wwwv.moj.go.jp/HOUAN/hoan11.html (carrying, in the Japanese lan-
guage, the full text of the amendments as well as a comparison of the Amended
Commercial Code with the pre-amendment Commercial Code) (last visited Mar.
6,2000).
7 Some might argue that the typical transaction described herein is a venture
capital transaction as opposed to a private equity transaction, which traditionally
takes the form of a 100% acquisition of an established industrial and consumer
products company and is financed by significant amounts of debt. However,
many private equity firms engage in Silicon Valley-style venture capital transac-
tions and partial acquisitions in addition to leveraged buy-out transactions. Ac-
cordingly, the terms are used interchangeably herein.
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ments in Japanese corporations, and the third column describes
variations from U.S. law or practice that should be kept in mind
when implementing such provisions in Japan. A more compre-
hensive analysis of whether and how such provisions can be used
in Japanese transactions is set forth in the body of this Article.
Summary of U.S. Investment Techniques and
Their Availability in Japan
Provision Available Remarks
A. Preferred Stock





Conversion Yes May be subject to post-IPO lock-up restrictions.
Anti-dilution Conver- Yes
sion Price Adjustment
Price Protec- Yes Weighted average and full ratchet adjustment are
tion/Conversion permissible.
Price Adjustment
Pre-emptive Rights Yes Statutory pre-emptive rights may apply in certain
circumstances.
B. Management Rights
Class-Based Voting No -> Yes Effective April 1, 2002, dass voting becomes per-
missible.
Super Majority Vot- Yes May specify super majority voting in a company's
ing on Extraordinary articles of incorporation (only monetary damages
Corporate Matters available if such voting requirements are specified
in a shareholders agreement).
Board Nomination Yes Board nomination rights may be stipulated in a
Rights shareholders agreement, but such rights may not
be specifically enforced (only monetary damages
available).
C. Exit Mechanisms
Redemption Yes Subject to limitations based upon the funds oth-
erwise available to a company for dividends or a
reduction in capital (requires special approval of
the shareholders).
Registration Rights N/A Because a company listing its shares in Japan
must register all of its outstanding shares, regis-
tration rights are only of use in the case of a de-
mand registration to force the company to pro-
ceed with an IPO or, alternatively, to permit the
investor to sell its shares in a public offering (i.e.,
to more than forty-nine investors).
Registration rights should be included in docu-
mentation if Japanese target company contem-
plates listing its shares on a U.S. exchange or
over-the-counter market.
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Put Rights Yes To avoid unexpected taxes, put rights must be
priced at fair value.
Tag-along/Drag- Yes Enforceable only against a party to the agreement.
along Rights
Transfer Restrictions Yes May not be specifically enforced (only monetary
(including rights of damages available).
first refusal)
3. CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED STOCK: DOWNSIDE PROTECTION AND
UPSIDE OPPORTUNITY
Newly-established technology or other growth companies are
typically established based upon a model in which the founders of
the company supply the business plan, and the investors supply
the capital necessary to execute that plan. An integral part of this
model is that the founders pay a substantially lower price for their
equity than the subsequent investors. This price difference gives
rise to two major problems if both the founders and the investors
receive common stock. First, in both the United States and Japan,
founders who pay a lower price for their common stock in com-
parison to their contemporaneous financial investors may incur
significant tax liabilities for purchasing "bargain stock." Second,
according to the corporate laws of both the United States and Ja-
pan, if a company runs into difficulties and, for example, is liqui-
dated, the assets of the company, after settling debts to creditors,
would be distributed to the common stockholders on a pro rata ba-
sis, thereby allowing the founders to walk away with a dispropor-
tionate (as compared to their initial monetary investment) amount
of the company's liquidated assets.
In the United States, the two problems described above are
typically addressed by having the founding shareholders receive
common stock and financial investors receive convertible preferred
stock, almost the universal security of choice for venture capital
firms investing in U.S. start-up companies. Preferred stock, which
by virtue of its preferences and other rights can be valued differ-
ently than common stock, generally avoids the imposition of tax on
the founders of a company who pay substantially less per share
than financial investors.8 Preferred stock also allows for various
protective features which can insure that investors receive their
money back before founders if a company runs into difficulties.
8 See I.R.C. § 83(a) (1990).
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Such protective features typically include liquidation and dividend
preferences vis-A-vis the common stock and price protection
(through adjustment of the preferred stock's conversion price in
the event of issuances of common or preferred stock for a price
lower than the price originally paid for the preferred stock). Fi-
nally, the conversion feature insures that financial investors, by
converting their preferred stock to common stock, can fully par-
ticipate in the appreciation of a company's value in the event that
the company succeeds. An additional advantage of preferred stock
(although unrelated to the tax and liquidation problems described
above) is that it allows for special voting and management rights,
discussed separately in Section 3 below.
Convertible preferred stock is also available as a vehicle for in-
vestment in Japanese corporations and, as in the United States, can
be used to address the taxation and downside risk issues discussed
above. Article 222, paragraph 1 of the Commercial Code provides
that a company may issue two or more classes of stock which differ
as to their particulars concerning the distribution of profits, interest
or surplus assets, or the redemption of shares by profits.9 After
implementation of the November Amendments on April 1, 2002,
classes of stock will also be able to differ with respect to voting
rights.10
Until recently, Japanese venture capital and private equity in-
vestors invested in common stock more frequently in Japan than
the United States. Japanese investors may have been willing to
forgo the protections commonly demanded by U.S. investors be-
cause their investments carried a much lower risk profile. Rather
than investing in start-up companies that were developing un-
proven (but possibly rewarding) new technologies, Japanese ven-
ture capitalists focused their investments on companies with
lengthy operating histories (ten-plus years) in traditional sectors of
the economy such as manufacturing, wholesale and retail distribu-
tion, consumer products, and services."
9 It is notable, however, that before the implementation of the November
Amendments, in contrast to the United States, a Japanese company could not have
multiple classes of common stock.
10 See AMENDED SHOHO, art. 222.
11 See Seth C. Hurwitz, Japanese Venture Capital Industry 11-15 (Sept 23, 1999)
(The MIT Japan Program: Science, Technology, Management paper MITJP 99-04)
(unpublished working paper, on file with author).
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Although preferred stock has come to be commonly used dur-
ing the past several years for venture capital transactions in Japan,
it differs from preferred stock in the United States in several nota-
ble respects.
3.1. Dividend and Liquidation Preferences
As in the United States, preferred stock in Japan may be desig-
nated as participating or non-participating and as bearing cumula-
tive or non-cumulative dividends.' 2 Preferred stock may also have
a preference over common stock upon liquidation.
13
"Deemed liquidation" provisions (i.e., provisions stating that a
preferred shareholder will receive its liquidation preference upon a
sale, merger or other change of control of the company as if the
company were being liquidated), although legal, are not specifi-
cally authorized by the Commercial Code and therefore should be
set forth in a shareholders' agreement as opposed to a company's
articles of incorporation. A deemed liquidation provision, of
course, would not be enforceable against any shareholder who is
not party to the shareholders' agreement containing such provi-
sion.
3.2. Mandatory/Optional Conversion
Documentation for preferred stock investments in the United
States and in Japan typically includes provisions for the conversion
of the preferred stock to common stock either at the option of the
holder ("optional conversion") or upon the occurrence of certain
events ("mandatory conversion"). 14 Although the right of optional
conversion of preferred stock seldom becomes a controversial is-
sue, there is a natural tension between founders/management and
preferred stock investors with respect to mandatory conversion.
12 See SHOHO, art. 222, para. 1.
13 Id.
14 After the implementation of the November Amendments to the Commer-
cial Code on April 1, 2002, the terms and conditions of convertible stock, includ-
ing any events requiring conversion, will be required to be set forth in a com-
pany's articles of incorporation. See AMENDED SHOHO, art. 222-8. In addition, the
terminology for convertible stock (until now referred to as tenkan kabushiki) in the
Commercial Code will, after the implementation of the November Amendments,
be bifurcated into "stock with a convertible option" (tenkan yoyaku ken-tsuki kabu-
shiki), AMENDED SHOHO, art 222-3, and "stock with a mandatory conversion provi-
sion" (tenkan yoyaku joko tsuki kabushila), AMENDED SHOHO, art. 222-8.
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This tension arises because the founders and other common stock-
holders will want the preferred stock to be converted as soon as
possible in order to eliminate the preferences, privileges, and rights
attaching to the preferred stock (thereby increasing the value of the
common stock), whereas the preferred stockholders will want to
delay conversion in order to preserve such preferences, privileges,
and rights.
Despite this tension, in almost every venture investment com-
pleted in the United States, both the company and the investors
find it beneficial to stipulate that all preferred stock will be auto-
matically converted to common stock upon the company's initial
public offering ("IPO") (or, more specifically in the United States,
upon the closing of a public offering of the company's common
stock with a minimum aggregate offering and price per share over
a specified amount). From the company's perspective, conversion
of the preferred stock immediately prior to an IPO increases the
market's reception of the common shares to be issued in the offer-
ing (by eliminating the senior security). From the investor's per-
spective, conversion immediately prior to an IPO is usually accept-
able because the completion of the IPO is objective evidence of
both the investment's success and a reasonable likelihood that the
investor will soon be able to exit the investment through a sale of
its common stock in the public market (although such an exit may
be subject to an underwriter's lock-up, the availability of exemp-
tions for the sale of restricted securities under the Securities Act,
and any registration rights which may have been negotiated by the
investor).
It is interesting to note that, although most venture companies
in the United States use mandatory conversion provisions to con-
vert preferred stock to common stock immediately prior to an IPO,
there is no U.S. government regulation, stock exchange, or over-
the-market listing rule that requires preferred stock to be converted
prior to an IPO. Provided that the terms of the preferred stock are
adequately disclosed in the company's disclosure documentation
(Form S-1), a company could conclude a public offering in the
United States with a class or classes of preferred stock outstanding
(whether an IPO with venture capital-style preferred stock out-
standing would be acceptable to either the market or the under-
writers, however, is another issue).
Until the fall of 2001, it was an unwritten rule of all Japanese
stock exchanges and over-the-counter markets that all convertible
220 [23:2
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preferred stock of a company be converted prior to the full fiscal
year immediately preceding the company's listing on an exchange
or over-the-counter market. According to conversations with vari-
ous Japanese attorneys, this unwritten rule or market practice
stemmed from the listing rule, common to all Japanese stock ex-
changes and over-the-counter markets, that no convertible war-
rant-bonds be outstanding during the fiscal year immediately pre-
ceding a company's listing.15
By requiring holders of preferred stock to convert their pre-
ferred stock to common stock and forego all of the protections of
the preferred stock at least one year prior to a company's IPO, this
unwritten rule forced an investor to trade its existing and hard-
negotiated preferred stock rights for the chance that the company
would successfully complete its IPO one year later. As has often
been the case during the past year, if the company postponed or
canceled its plans for an IPO, the shareholder was left "naked"
with common stock for an indefinite period (during which addi-
tional financing or even liquidation of the company could occur).
In lieu of the outright prohibition on holding convertible stock
or warrants prior to an IPO, the Tokyo and Osaka stock exchanges
have recently implemented mandatory post-IPO lock-up periods
(i.e., periods during which an investor may not sell its shares) for
holders of convertible stock or warrants under certain circum-
stances.
For example, under the newly adopted Tokyo Stock Exchange
rules, convertible stock issued before the first full fiscal year prior
to a company's IPO (the period from the beginning of such full fis-
cal year until approval of the listing application being referred to
as the "restricted period") may be held as convertible stock during
the restricted period and, after approval of the company's listing
application, converted into common stock and freely sold in the
market. Convertible stock issued during the restricted period is
subject to a lock-up period extending until the latter of six months
after an IPO or the one year anniversary of the issuance of the
shares (a similar rule exists for common shares issued during this
period).
15 See TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE STOCK LISTING INVESTIGATION STANDARDS [kabu-
ken joojoo shinsa kilun] art. 20 (enacted Mar. 15,1949, as amended) [hereinafter TSE
INVESTIGATION STANDARDS].
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The new rules contain one illogical aspect of which investors
should be aware. Although an investor which owns convertible
stock prior to the restricted period could convert its preferred stock
immediately after the expiration of the restricted period and then
sell the resulting common stock in the public market after the IPO,
if the investor converts the convertible stock during the restricted
period, the resulting common stock becomes subject to the lock-up
restrictions. As the end result under both scenarios (i.e., the sale of
common stock to the public post-IPO) is identical, it is difficult to
understand the rationale for imposing a lock-up based upon when
the preferred stock is converted.
3.3. Conversion Price Adjustments
The "conversion price" of preferred stock determines the num-
ber of shares of common stock into which one share of preferred
stock may be converted. Generally, the initial conversion price of
newly issued preferred stock is such that one share of preferred
stock is convertible into one share of common stock. Thereafter, if
the conversion price is adjusted downward, for example, the num-
ber of shares of common stock the holder of the preferred stock
will receive upon conversion will correspondingly increase.
In the United States, there are two principal types of adjust-
ments to the conversion price: "anti-dilution" adjustments that
maintain the current conversion ratio in the event of stock splits,
reverse stock splits, stock dividends, and similar re-capitalizations;
and "price-protection" adjustments which protect the holder
against future issuances of common or preferred stock by the com-
pany at a price per share that is less than the conversion price of
the preferred stock.
Both "anti-dilution" and "price-protection" conversion price
adjustments (whether on a weighted average or full ratchet basis)
may be implemented in Japan. The Commercial Code contains
two rules relevant to conversion price adjustment provisions: (1)
the issue price of the new shares must be equal to the issue price of
the convertible shares16 and (2) during the time between incorpo-
ration and conversion, a company is required to reserve a sufficient
number of shares of each class of stock to be issued upon conver-
sion.17
16 See SHOHO, art. 222-3.
17 See SHOHO, art. 222-2, para. 3.
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3.4. Pre-emptive Rights
In both the United States and Japan, investors often use pre-
emptive rights-the right to participate in future equity offerings
to the extent necessary to preserve an investor's percentage equity
stake in a company-to prevent their ownership stake in a com-
pany from being diluted by future issuances of equity securities.
As in the United States, pre-emptive rights in Japan may be based
upon a specific provision in a company's articles of incorporation
or upon a contractual arrangement separate from the company's
charter documents.
It is important to note that in Japan, even if pre-emptive rights
are not contractually provided for or in a company's articles of in-
corporation, shareholders may have statutory Pre-emptive rights in
certain circumstances. Such statutory Pre-emptive rights arise in
circumstances where (1) the articles of incorporation provide that
transfers of shares by shareholders must be approved by the com-
pany's board of directors, (which is a common provision in the ar-
ticles of incorporation of closely-held Japanese corporations); and
(2) the issuance of new shares is not approved by a special resolu-
tion of the shareholders (i.e., approved by two-thirds of the share-
holders in attendance at a meeting of the shareholders). 18
4. PROTECTING AN INVESTMENT THROUGH MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
Although liquidation preferences, conversion price adjust-
ments, and other rights described above can be quite important in
protecting an investment, investors often take the most comfort in
their own ability to steer a company away from disaster and to-
wards profitability. Yet venture capital investments are almost al-
ways for less than a majority and usually for less than one-third of
the voting stock of a company. An investor holding a minority
stake is only entitled to negative control over certain extraordinary
corporate actions, as stipulated by applicable corporate law. For
example, the sale of all of a company's assets must be approved by
two-thirds of the shareholders attending a special meeting of the
shareholders under Japanese law19 and by a majority of the share-
holders entitled to vote under Delaware law.20 Accordingly, a
18 See SHOHO, art 280-5-2-
19 See SHOHO, art 245.
20 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (2000).
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venture capital investor holding at least two-thirds of a Japanese
company's outstanding shares would have a veto right with re-
spect to such sales.
Dissatisfied with the limited management rights available to
minority investors under applicable corporate laws, venture capital
and private equity investors often attempt to secure additional
rights through amendment of a company's charter documents or
through contractual arrangements.
4.1. Charter Documents
4.1.1. Class Voting Rights
In U.S. transactions, venture capital and private equity inves-
tors often secure management rights by amending a subject com-
pany's articles of incorporation to require the separate approval of
the holders of a majority (or super majority) of its preferred stock
(or of each class or even each series of its preferred stock) for cer-
tain matters submitted to a vote of its shareholders or for the elec-
tion of one or more directors.2' This can either guarantee the hold-
ers of preferred stock representation on the board of directors or
provide the holders of the preferred stock a de facto veto right with
respect to matters requiring the separate approval of a class or se-
ries of preferred stock which such shareholders would not have
been able to control if they voted with the common stock as a sin-
gle class. In addition, if class voting is set forth in a company's
certificate of incorporation, in the event that a company acts with-
out first obtaining the required approvals, its preferred stockhold-
ers can apply to a court for equitable relief.22 Investors in the
United States also use voting provisions in shareholders' agree-
ments, either in addition to or instead of class voting arrange-
ments, to achieve control over key decisions and the election of di-
rectors. However, whether a shareholder will be able to obtain
specific enforcement, as opposed to monetary damages, for the
violation of voting provisions in a shareholders' agreement
21 For example, Section 151(a) of the Delaware Code provides that each class
or series of stock may have "such voting powers, full or limited, or no voting
powers," as are stipulated in a company's certificate of incorporation. See id. §
151(a).
22 See id. § 111.
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(whether at the shareholders or board of directors level) is not as
dear-cut.23
Until the April 2002 implementation of the November
Amendments described below, the Japanese Commercial Code had
not provided companies and investors with similar flexibility in
allocating management rights among shareholders. Article 241 of
the Commercial Code states that, consistent with the general Japa-
nese legal principle of equality among shareholders, each share-
holder shall have one vote for each share. That class-based voting
is not allowed is further clarified by Article 222(1) of the Commer-
cial Code. Article 222(1), which specifically enumerates the par-
ticulars by which two shares of stock can differ, does not list voting
rights.24
Under the pre-amendment Commercial Code, there are only
two exceptions to the one-share/one-vote rule. The first exception
permits non-voting stock, subject to certain limitations. A com-
pany may issue preferred stock with no voting rights, provided
that such stock constitutes no more than one-third of the com-
pany's capital stock.25 This exception is of limited utility in most
venture capital transactions, where investors desire preferred dis-
tributions and special voting rights.
The second exception (which remains unchanged under the
November Amendments) to the one-share/one-vote rule is that
class-based voting is mandatory with respect to any amendment to
a company's articles of incorporation that may be considered
prejudicial to a specific class of shareholders. 26 This provides im-
portant protection to preferred shareholders with respect to certain
23 In Delaware, specific enforcement of voting agreements appears to be
available under Section 218(c) of the Delaware Code which states that an agree-
ment between two or more stockholders may provide that "the shares held by
them shall be voted as provided by the agreement" However, such an agreement
binds only the shareholders party thereto, whereas the certificate of incorporation
binds a company and all of its shareholders. Id. § 218(c).
24 Article 222-1 of the Commercial Code provides that a company "may issue
two or more classes of shares which differ with respect to their particulars con-
cerning the distribution of profits, interest or surplus assets, or the redemption of
shares by profits." See SHOHO, art. 222-1.
25 See SHOHO, art 242, para. 3. Voting rights are reinstated if the right to re-
ceive a preferred distribution is suspended by a resolution at a general meeting of
the shareholders. Id. para. 1-2. After implementation of the Amended Commer-
cial Code, the limitation on the number of shares with restricted voting rights is
relaxed to one-half of a company's capital stock. See AMENDED SHOHO, art. 222-5.
26 See SHOHO, art 345.
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decisions, such as the creation of new classes of preferred stock
with rights preferential to the existing preferred stock. However, it
does not allow preferred shareholders to exert control over matters
not requiring amendments to the company's articles of incorpora-
tion (such as the issuance of new shares of common stock, the in-
currence of debt, or significant acquisitions) or matters that are not
deemed to be prejudicial to preferred shareholders under Japanese
law (such as increasing the number of a company's authorized
shares of common stock).
The limits on class voting under the pre-amendment Commer-
cial Code largely disappear upon the implementation of the
Amended Commercial Code on April 1, 2002. Article 222-7 of the
Amended Commercial Code permits a company to issue a class of
stock with the right to vote as a class on any or all matters requir-
ing a vote of a meeting of the shareholders or the board of direc-
tors.27 The matters requiring approval of a given class of shares
must be set forth in a company's articles of incorporation.28 It ap-
pears that such matters may include the election of directors.
4.1.2. Super Majority Voting
Another way in which investors in the United States use char-
ter amendments to secure management rights is to provide that
certain corporate actions (such as the incurrence of indebtedness
over a certain threshold or the establishment of a subsidiary) re-
quire the special approval of either the shareholders or the board
of directors of a company. In each case, an investor will try to set
the voting requirement of such approval at a level requiring its ap-
proval, thereby giving the investor a de facto veto right with re-
spect to the specified corporate action. The Delaware Code pro-
vides investors the flexibility to raise the voting requirements for
actions of either the board of directors29 or the shareholders.30
27 Several class-based voting techniques remain unavailable. For example, in
contrast to the rules for Japanese limited liability companies (yugen gaisha), even
after the implementation of the Amended Commercial Code, a stock corporation
(kabushiki kaisha) may not have a class of stock with multiple votes per share. See
Limited Liability Company Law of Japan, art. 39. Generally, however, the same
results may be achieved through use of the class-based veto rights described in
the text above.
28 See AMENDED SHOHO, art. 222-7.
29 See tit. 8, § 141(b).
30 See id. § 216.
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In Japan, super majority requirements at both the board of di-
rectors and shareholders level (subject to the gray area discussed
further below) may be included in a company's articles of incorpo-
ration. The Commercial Code expressly allows a company's arti-
cles of incorporation to stipulate quorum and voting requirements
for a company's board of directors which are more stringent than
the default rule (which requires, unless otherwise provided by the
company's articles of incorporation or the Commercial Code, all
resolutions to be adopted by a majority vote of the directors pres-
ent at a meeting attended by at least a majority of the directors).3'
When drafting such provisions, however, quorum and voting re-
quirements should be stated generally in terms of the number of
directors required to form a quorum or to approve a resolution.
Most practitioners doubt that a provision requiring the approval of
a particular director (identified either by name or by his nominat-
ing party) would be enforceable if challenged.3 2
The default quorum and voting requirements for actions to be
approved by shareholders are set forth in Article 239 of the Com-
mercial Code, which states that, "except as otherwise provided for
by this Code or by the articles of incorporation, all resolutions of a
shareholders' general meeting shall be adopted by a majority of
votes of the shareholders present who hold shares representing
more than one-half of the total number of the issued shares."3 3 The
phrase "except as otherwise provided for... by the articles of in-
corporation" has been construed as permitting more stringent or
relaxed quorum and voting requirements to be included in the ar-
ticles of incorporation.
With respect to certain extraordinary corporate events specified
in the Commercial Code, such as amendment of the articles of in-
corporation, merger, or dissolution, the Commercial Code itself re-
quires more stringent quorum and voting requirements (a vote of
two-thirds or more of the shareholders who are present and who
hold shares representing more than one-half of the total number of
the issued shares).34 In these instances, the Commercial Code does
not expressly permit more stringent requirements to be included in
3' See SHOHO, art 260-2(1).
32 See SHINPAN CHUSHAKu KAISHAHO NEW EDITION ANNOTATED COMPANY LAW
113-14 (Katsuro Kamiyanagi et al. eds., 1987).
33 See SHOHO, art 239.
34 See SHOHO, art 343.
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a company's articles of incorporation, and some practitioners feel
that such a provision would be void.35
4.2. Contractual Arrangements
In addition to requiring class-based voting or super majority
voting rights to be incorporated into a company's charter docu-
ments, investors in U.S. venture capital transactions often use
shareholder agreements to secure management rights in the com-
pany. Use of such shareholder agreements is sanctioned by Section
218(c) of the Delaware Code, which provides that an agreement
between two or more shareholders may provide that, "the shares
held by them shall be voted as provided by the agreement."36 In
contrast, Japan has no similar statutory provision blessing the use
of contractual arrangements among shareholders to govern the ex-
ercise of voting rights. The absence of statutory guidance on this
issue in Japan leads to several notable differences from U.S. trans-
actions with respect to the effectiveness of including management
rights in shareholders' agreements.
4.2.1. Director Nomination Rights
Private equity and venture capital investors in the U.S. com-
monly demand representation on a company's board of directors.
Board representation is assured either through the class-voting
mechanism described above or by including in a shareholders
agreement among the investor and the other shareholders, a provi-
sion obligating the other shareholders to vote the shares held by
them to elect to the board of directors a nominee selected by the
investor. If a shareholder breaches its obligations under such a
shareholders agreement by voting its shares for a different candi-
date, the investor would be able to petition the appropriate U.S.
state court for an injunction ordering the shareholder to vote its
shares in accordance with the shareholders agreement.
In Japan, although a provision to vote for specified nominees to
the board of directors appears to be valid, there is a consensus
among scholars and practitioners that if a shareholder votes its
35 See, e.g., Donald P. Swisher, Use of Shareholder Agreements and Other Control
Techniques in Japanese Joint Venture Corporations and Their Validity Under Japanese
Corporate Law, 9 INT'L L. 159,167 (1975), reprinted in LAW AND INVESTMENT IN JAPAN
318 (Yukio Yanagida et al. eds., 1994).
36 See tit 8, § 218(c).
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shares in violation of the agreement, the votes are valid as cast (i.e.,
the provision may be valid but is not enforceable through specific
performance).37 Accordingly, an aggrieved investor's only re-
course would be to sue the breaching shareholder for monetary
damages (which are difficult to prove in the case of failure to elect
a director). One method that has been used to give such provisions
"teeth" is to require a shareholder to pay liquidated damages or a
penalty upon failure to vote for an investor's nominee.38
4.2.2. Super Majority Voting
U.S. investors sometimes rely upon provisions in shareholder
agreements (as opposed to a company's charter documents) to se-
cure veto rights over certain extraordinary corporate actions. Such
provisions are typically structured as covenants by the sharehold-
ers party to the shareholders agreement to vote their shares (or to
cause the director nominated by them to vote) in favor of a par-
ticular corporate action only with the prior approval of the inves-
tor. For most investors, however, including such provisions in a
shareholders' agreement rather than in the company's charter
documents is less desirable because such provisions are unenforce-
able in certain states39 and, even if such provisions are valid as
between the shareholders, they may not be enforceable directly
against the company.4 0
In Japan, super majority provisions in shareholder agreements
have been similarly difficult or impossible to enforce. In the event
voting provisions in a shareholders' agreement are breached, the
non-breaching shareholder(s) would be unable to obtain injunctive
relief from a court ordering the breaching shareholder to vote its
shares in compliance with the shareholders agreement.41 Again,
liquidated damages may assist the investor in encouraging the
other shareholders not to purposefully breach such a provision.
37 See Swisher, supra note 35, at 164.
3s See MINPO, arL 420 (permitting parties to contract for liquidated damages).
39 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONs
§ 4.15 (3d ed. 1997).
40 See AMENDED SHOHO, supra note 10.
41 See DOING BusINEss IN JAPAN, supra note 4, § 9.15[2].
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4.3. Additional Practical Difficulties in Exercising Management Rights
in Japan
One of the primary obstades to a foreign investor's active par-
ticipation in the management of a Japanese company is geographic,
many investors being a full day's travel from Japan. Although
shareholders of a Japanese company may currently participate in a
shareholders' meeting by proxy, the November Amendments fur-
ther facilitate a non-resident investor's ability to exercise his voting
rights. After the implementation of the November Amendments
on April 1, 2002, a company's board of directors may provide by
resolution that shareholders may exercise their voting rights (and
be counted for the purposes of constituting a quorum) in a share-
holders' meeting by written instructions delivered to the company
at least one day prior to such a meeting.42 Furthermore, such
written instructions may, if permitted by the company's board, be
provided by electronic means such as e-mail.43
In contrast to the exercise of voting rights as a shareholder, rep-
resentation on the board of directors of a Japanese company pres-
ents several practical difficulties for venture capital and private
equity firms that do not have representatives who reside in Japan.
First, the Commercial Code does not allow board members to at-
tend meetings of the board of directors other than in person. Al-
though it is generally accepted that directors may attend meetings
via video conference (i.e., the participants must be both seen and
heard), neither actions by unanimous written consent nor partici-
pation in board meetings by telephone is allowed. Thus, notice pe-
riods for meetings of the board of directors should be determined
such that any non-resident director will have adequate time to ar-
range travel to Japan. In addition, Article 260 of the Commercial
Code requires a board of directors to meet at least on a quarterly
basis.44
5. ExIT STRATEGIES
The first question most U.S. private equity and venture capital
investors ask when considering whether to make an investment is
how they can exit the investment. Such "exit strategies" may in-
42 See AMENDED SHOHO, art. 239-2.
43 See id. art. 239-2(3).
44 See AMENDED SHOHO, art. 260.
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clude the sale of the investor's shares to the public (in or after an
IPO), to a potential acquirer of the company or to the company it-
self or its other shareholders. Implementing such exit strategies
can be greatly facilitated by negotiating certain contractual provi-
sions and preferred stock features when initially structuring an in-
vestment. In the United States, such contractual/preferred stock
rights often include registration rights, redemption rights and
various put, tag-along (or co-sale), and drag-along rights.
5.1. Registration Rights
The preferred exit for most investors, and the exit which typi-
cally provides the highest return on their investment, is the sale of
their stock in the public market after (and sometimes as part of)45 a
company's IPO. Under U.S. securities laws, however, a pre-IPO
investor may sell its unregistered shares46 on the public markets
after an IPO only subject to the rules of Rule 144 of the United
States Securities Act of 1933, as amended. Under Rule 144, a pre-
IPO investor may not sell the subject securities without registration
or another exemption from the federal securities laws until the
later of one year from the date of acquisition of such securities or
ninety days after the issuer becomes a reporting company. During
the second year after the date of acquisition for an investor other
than an "affiliate" of the issuer, (i.e., an officer, director or owner of
more than ten percent of the outstanding shares) such investor
may sell limited amounts of its shares (during any three month pe-
riod, up to the greater of one percent of the outstanding stock or
the average weekly trading volume during the preceding four
weeks).
Following the two-year anniversary of the acquisition of the se-
curities, non-affiliate investors may sell such shares in the public
market free of these volume limitations. With respect to an inves-
tor which is an affiliate of the issuer, sales of stock by such investor
remain subject to the volume limitations described above indefi-
45 Allowing shareholders to sell their shares as part of a company's IPO is
generally discouraged by the underwriters for several reasons, including: (1) the
perception by the market that in certain cases such sales signify that the existing
shareholders do not believe that the company will be successful after the IPO, and
(2) the fact that the company will not receive the proceeds of the sale.
46 In the United States, all shares to be offered to the public, subject to limited
exemptions, must be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Securities Exchange Act of 1933,15 U.S.C. § 78 (2000).
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nitely after the one-year anniversary of such investor's acquisition
of shares. Accordingly, venture capital investors which acquire
shares shortly before an IPO or which own more than ten percent
of a company's shares will be subject to the restrictions of Rule 144
following an IPO. In order to sell a number of shares exceeding the
limits of Rule 144, an investor will need to register its shares or sell
its shares pursuant to another exemption under the Securities Act.
Because it is difficult, if not impossible, for an investor to reg-
ister its shares of a company in the United States without the coop-
eration of the company, most investors negotiate in advance the
right to require the company to register their stock. Such rights are
typically in the form of demand rights (the right to cause the com-
pany to register the investor's stock at the time chosen by the in-
vestors), piggyback rights (the right to participate in an offering ini-
tiated by the company), or shelf rights (the right to cause the
company to register the investor's stock pursuant to Form S-3 (for
foreign issuers, Form F-3), an abbreviated-and much cheaper to
prepare- form which may be used by companies with a significant
public float).
Traditionally, investors in Japanese private companies have not
requested registration rights. One reason for this may be that, al-
though Japanese securities laws also require that stock be regis-
tered before being sold to the public, the listing rules for Japanese
stock exchanges and over-the-counter markets require that a com-
pany register and list all of its shares,47 in contrast to the United
States, where only shares included in a particular offering are reg-
istered. Accordingly, registration rights, with the exceptions noted
below, are not necessary for companies intending to list in Japan
because all of the shares owned by an investor would be registered
at the time of the IPO and, subject to the mandatory lock-up period
for newly-issued or converted stock discussed in Section 3.2 above
and any underwriter's lock-up or similar contractual arrangement,
immediately saleable in the public market.
Nevertheless, certain situations may warrant negotiating reg-
istration rights with respect to a Japanese company, including: (1)
when investors wish to be able to force a company (through the
exercise of a demand right) to initiate an IPO in Japan in the first
instance, (2) when investors wish to be able to sell a portion of their
shares (through the exercise of piggyback rights) as part of an IPO
47 TSE INVESTIGATION STANDARDS, supra note 15, § 4(1)(a).
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in Japan initiated by a company, and (3) under circumstances in
which a Japanese company is contemplating an IPO in the United
States, its investors wish to be able to sell their shares free of the re-
strictions of Rule 144.48 In addition, although not strictly speaking
a "registration right" (because all of a company's outstanding
shares will have been registered at the time of an IPO in Japan), an
investor may wish to secure a company's cooperation in the mar-
keting of a post-IPO secondary sale of a large block of such inves-
tor's shares (i.e., the company's participation in road shows).
The use of a demand right to force an IPO is fiercely opposed
by most companies and is often excluded from demand rights in
the documentation for U.S. venture capital transactions. When ac-
cepted by a company, the use of a demand right to force an PO is
often conditioned upon the passage of time (typically three to five
years), or the achievement of certain minimum revenue, or net in-
come targets indicating that the company has some likelihood of
completing a successful offering.
The use of piggyback rights in connection with an IPO can also
be controversial, as underwriters may be reluctant to include the
shares of shareholders in an IPO because of a possible negative
impact on the marketability of the offering.
After observing several Japanese companies, including Cray-
fish and Internet Initiative Japan, successfully complete IPOs on
the U.S. Nasdaq market, many investors in Japanese companies
have begun to include registration rights in documentation in Ja-
pan. Such registration rights provisions in Japanese shareholder
agreements typically state that they are equally applicable to list-
ings in the United States or Japan.
It is also important to note, as described above, that the listing
standards of Japanese stock exchanges and over-the-counter mar-
kets (1) impose a mandatory lock-up period for shares purchased
during the first full fiscal year immediately preceding an IPO, and
(2) prohibit a company from issuing any shares (other than on a
pro rata basis to existing shareholders) during the period com-
mencing on the first day of the fiscal year during which the com-
pany is to complete its IPO and ending on the date of the PO. For
example, the Tokyo Stock Exchange rules provide that, in the event
48 The use of both demand rights and piggyback rights in connection with an
IPO are commonly carved out of demand and piggyback rights in U.S. transac-
tions unless an investor is in a particularly strong bargaining position vis-A-vis a
company.
2002]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
that an investor subscribes for new shares during the one year pe-
riod ending on the last day of the fiscal year immediately prior to
the fiscal year in which the company completes its IPO, the inves-
tor must agree not to sell or transfer such shares for a period end-
ing on the latter of six months after the IPO or one year after the
investor's purchase of such shares. 49
5.2. Redemption
Some U.S. investors require that their preferred stock include a
feature allowing the investor to redeem (i.e., to cause the company
to repurchase and cancel) the preferred stock at the investor's op-
tion. Such redemption rights are usually exercisable for only a
limited period commencing several years after the original pur-
chase of the preferred stock. Such preferred shares are typically
redeemable at a purchase price equal to the original purchase price
plus a reasonable rate of return.
For two reasons, however, redemption is not a universal fea-
ture of preferred stock in the United States. First, optional re-
demption rights can be quite onerous to the issuing company be-
cause they may require the company to pay out a substantial
amount of cash regardless of the company's cash flow situation.
Second, from the investor's perspective, redemption rights are of-
ten rendered meaningless because the applicable corporate law
often prohibits the issuing company from redeeming its shares in
the circumstances in which the investor is most likely to desire to
exercise its option to redeem (i.e., when the company is doing
poorly). Section 160(a) of the Delaware Code, for example, pro-
hibits the redemption of shares when "such purchase or redemp-
tion would cause any impairment of the capital of the corpora-
tion."5 0 "Impairment of capital" has been defined by the Delaware
courts as "the reduction of the amount of the assets of the company
below the amount represented by the aggregate outstanding shares
of the capital stock of the company."51 In other words, a corpora-
49 See TSE INVESTIGATION STANDARDS, supra note 15, § 17 and Rule 15(2)(1) of
the interpretive rules thereunder.
50 See tit. 8, § 160(a).
51 In re Int'l Radiator Co., 92 A. 255, 256 (Del. Ch. 1914).
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tion may only use surplus capital to repurchase its own shares,52
which is the same as the rule for declaring and paying dividends.5 3
A company's redemption of shares is similarly restricted in Ja-
pan.54 Section 210 of the Commercial Code permits a company to
acquire its own shares with the approval of the shareholders at an
ordinary meeting of the shareholders. 55 The redemption price for
such shares, however, must be less than the total amount of funds
available to a company for distribution as dividends.56
Generally speaking, an investor is unlikely to desire to redeem
its shares in circumstances where the company is earning sufficient
profits to redeem shares out of profits available for dividends (be-
cause it signifies that the company is successful and that the in-
vestor's shares will continue to appreciate in value). Accordingly,
in most circumstances an investor hoping to bail out of an unsuc-
cessful investment would be forced to rely on redemption by
means of a reduction of capital.
5.3. Put Rights, Tag-Along Rights, and Drag-Along Rights
A third way in which investors in the United States secure an
exit from their investment is by obtaining certain contractual rights
which facilitate the investors' sale of their shares of a company in a
private sale (i.e., not in a sale via the public market as a part of or
after an IPO). These rights include the following:
52 See 1 RODMAN WARD, JR. ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL
CORPORATiON LAW § 160.4 (4th ed. 2001).
53 See tit. 8, § 170.
54 Until the enactment of recent amendments to the Commercial Code on
October 1, 2001, the redemption of shares was prohibited as a general principle,
with limited exceptions for, among other things, fractional shares, appraisal
rights, and employee stock incentive plans. See SHOHO, art. 210. In the venture
capital context, preferred shares could only be redeemed if they were to be imme-
diately cancelled in accordance with the provisions relating to the reduction of
capital, or where such cancellation was to be effected out of profits which were
otherwise available to be paid to the shareholders as dividends. See SHOHO, art
212. Furthermore, under Japanese law, a reduction of capital must be approved
by shareholders holding more than two-thirds of the issued and outstanding
shares present at a meeting attended by more than one-half of the outstanding
shares. Because such a resolution may not be approved in advance (i.e., at the
time the preferred shares are issued) and because, as discussed above, a covenant
by the shareholders to vote to approve such a resolution in the future cannot be
enforced through specific performance, redemption by means of reduction of
capital always remained subject to the approval of the shareholders.
55 See SHOHO, art. 210.
56 Id. art 210-3.
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(1) put rights-the right of an investor to require other share-
holders to purchase its shares at a certain price.
(2) tag-along or co-sale rights-the right of an investor to require
other shareholders (usually founders or majority shareholders)
who desire to sell their shares to a third party to require, as a con-
dition to such sale, the third party to also purchase the investors'
shares for the same price per share.
(3) drag-along rights-the right of an investor, in the event that
such investor identifies a purchaser who desires to purchase 100%
of the company, to require the other shareholders to also sell their
shares to the purchaser (thereby allowing the investor to initiate
the sale of 100% of the company).
Although contractual provisions for put rights, tag-along
rights, and drag-along rights are generally enforceable in Japan,
there are two issues to consider when drafting such provisions.
First, the articles of incorporation of many private Japanese
companies require all transfers of shares to be approved by the
board of directors of the company 5 7 If a company's articles of in-
corporation contain such a restriction, any transfer made pursuant
to such a put right, tag-along right, or drag-along right would be
subject to such board approval. In the event that the board of di-
rectors does not approve a proposed transfer of shares by a share-
holder, the board must designate an alternative purchaser of such
shares or, if the board is unable to designate an alternative pur-
chaser (which may include the company), the shareholder may
transfer the shares to the originally proposed purchaser.58
The second issue concerns the price paid for shares transferred
pursuant to a put option (for reasons described below, tag-along
and drag-along rights are not affected). In the United States, the
purchase price for shares sold pursuant to a put right is often des-
ignated in a shareholders agreement not as the fair market value of
such shares, but rather as an amount equal to some multiple of the
original purchase price or other calculation of the investor's de-
sired return on their investment. In Japan, however, if the pur-
chase price is not equal to the fair market value of the shares at the
time of transfer, there is some risk that the seller or the purchaser
would be liable for taxes with respect to the difference between the
57 Article 204 of the Commercial Code provides that the articles of incorpora-
tion may stipulate that the transfer of shares requires the approval of the board of
directors. See SHOHO, art. 204.
ss Id. art. 204-2, para. 3.
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purchase price and the fair market value of the shares (the form
and applicable rate of the tax may differ depending upon the iden-
tity of the seller and the purchaser).
6. TRANSFER RESTRICrIONS
Documentation for U.S. venture capital and private equity
transactions often includes restrictions concerning the transfer of
shares. Although their purpose is generally the same (i.e., to con-
trol the identity of a company's shareholders), such transfer re-
strictions may be divided into two categories: (1) flat prohibitions
on transfers designed to maintain certain current shareholders as
shareholders of the company, and (2) transfer restrictions which
exclude unknown or undesirable third parties from becoming
shareholders.
Unconditional prohibitions on transfers are most often used to
restrict sales of shares by founders or key management. In the
United States, one of the key considerations of venture capital in-
vestors in determining whether to invest in a company is the re-
tention of the company's founders and top management who, by
terminating their employment and selling their shares in the com-
pany, might be able to retire in luxury or move on to start a new
business. Because employees cannot be compelled to work despite
the existence of an employment agreement (even in Silicon Valley
involuntary servitude is illegal), investors instead focus on tying,
pursuant to transfer restrictions in a shareholder agreement, the
founders and management to the company's fortune by prohibit-
ing them from selling their shares for a certain period after the in-
vestor's investment or the company's IPO. If the greater part of the
founders' and management's net worth is tied up in shares of a
company, it is presumed that they will continue to exert their best
efforts as employees of the company.
The other category of transfer restrictions used in the United
States (i.e., restrictions which deter undesirable third parties from
becoming shareholders of the company) commonly takes the form
of "rights of first refusal." Rights of first refusal provide that in the
event a shareholder desires to sell its shares to a third party, the
other shareholders will have the right to purchase such shares first.
A right of first refusal provision in a shareholder agreement allows
the non-selling shareholders to keep the shares of a company "all
in the family" by purchasing the exiting shareholder's shares.
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Both unconditional prohibitions on transfer and rights of first
refusal are treated similarly under Japanese law. Generally
speaking, such transfer restrictions, when included in a sharehold-
ers agreement to which a transferring shareholder is a party, are
valid. However, if a transferring shareholder transfers his shares
in breach of a shareholders agreement and the transferee legally
acquires such shares, the transfer would be valid.59 Legends on
share certificates indicating that the shares are subject to transfer
restrictions set forth in a shareholders' agreement, a technique
commonly used in the United States to put potential transferees of
such shares on notice of such restrictions, are without legal effect in
Japan.60 Accordingly, while a shareholder who transfers his shares
in violation of transfer restrictions in a shareholder agreement
would be liable to the other shareholders for monetary damages
(which could be extremely difficult to calculate and collect), such
shareholder's transfer of its shares would not be unwound.
In addition to rights of first refusal, a Japanese company may
have an additional method of controlling who becomes a share-
holder. As discussed above in connection with put rights, tag-
along rights, and drag-along rights, a Japanese company may
specify in its articles of incorporation that all transfers of shares
must, as a condition of their transfer, be approved by the board of
directors.61
7. CONCLUSION
With careful attention to the differences between U.S. and
Japanese law, a private equity or venture capital investor can suc-
cessfully negotiate and document an investment in a Japanese
company which will have most, if not all, of the standard protec-
tions and exit strategies typically provided to investors in U.S.
59 See DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 5, § 9.04[10].
60 Share certificates in Japan may bear a legend stating that transfers are sub-
ject to the approval of the company's board of directors, provided that such re-
striction is also included in the company's articles of incorporation and that such
articles are registered with the relevant legal affairs bureau. See SHOHO, arts.
188(II)(3), 204, 225-8. The legend may not include more specifically tailored pro-
hibitions, such as limits on transfers to competitors only. In addition, in cases
where a board of directors does not approve a proposed transfer, the Commercial
Code requires the Company to find an alternative purchaser. See id. art 204-2.
Accordingly, both the flexibility and the effectiveness of such a legend in Japan is
limited in comparison to the United States.
61 See id. art. 204-1.
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companies. While this Article is intended to serve as a checklist to
ensure that such investor protections and exit strategies are cor-
rectly analyzed and provided for, it would be prudent to confer
with Japanese counsel regarding any subsequent changes to the
Commercial Code and accepted business practices in Japan.
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